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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Grizzard failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
unified sentence of 21 years, with six years fixed (with credit for five years and four days
served), upon his guilty plea to robbery?

Grizzard Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Grizzard pled guilty to robbery, and the district court imposed a unified sentence of 21
years, with six years fixed, and gave him credit for “1,829 days (5 years and 4 days) served.”
(R., pp.106-09; Aug., p.2 (underlining and bolding omitted).) Grizzard filed a notice of appeal
timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.113-16.)
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Grizzard asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his rehabilitative potential,
acceptance of responsibility, and claim that “the district court’s reliance on [his] criminal history
to justify the sentence imposed went beyond what was reasonable.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)
The record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
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The penalty for robbery is not less than five years, up to life in prison. I.C. § 18-6503.
The district court imposed a unified sentence of 21 years, with six years fixed, which falls well
within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.106-09.) Moreover, the district court gave Grizzard
credit for five years and four days of prejudgment incarceration, effectively making the fixed
portion of his sentence less than one year. (Aug., p.2.) Although Grizzard argues otherwise, the
court’s sentencing decision was not only statutorily authorized, it was perfectly reasonable in
light of the nature of the crime, Grizzard’s criminal history, his demonstrated failures to be
deterred or rehabilitated despite prior legal sanctions and opportunities on probation, and the
need to punish Grizzard while at the same time protecting the community.
Grizzard committed the robbery of which he was convicted in this case in May 2013.
(PSI, pp.4-5. 1) He approached a Walmart cashier under the pretense of purchasing a bottle of
water, but as soon as the cashier opened the cash register, Grizzard “came around the counter,
held his right hand up to her neck and demanded money.” (PSI, p.4.) He “then reached into the
register and grabbed a handful of cash,” including $100 and $50 bills. (PSI, pp.4, 53.) He also
“grabbed the radio that was in [the cashier’s] pocket and the bottle of water, and fled the store.”
(PSI, p.4.) Officers who responded to the scene reported that, in reviewing video surveillance of
the incident, it “appeared [Grizzard] was holding a shiny object in his right hand when he held it
up to [the cashier’s] neck,” although it “was unclear” what that object was. (PSI, pp.4, 56.)
After leaving the Walmart, Grizzard discarded some of his clothing, as well as the radio
he had stolen from the cashier. (PSI, pp.4-5.) Apparently believing he was having a heart attack,
he then checked himself into a local hospital for testing. (PSI, pp.5-6.) Upon being released “a
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file, “Supreme Court No
46198-2018 Lawrence Henry Grizzard Confidential Exhibits on Appeal.pdf.”
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couple of hours” later, Grizzard drove to South Carolina, where he was later arrested on a
misdemeanor warrant. (PSI, pp.6, 9.)
Grizzard’s conviction in this case was only the latest in a string of convictions resulting
from violent and theft related offenses. (See PSI, pp.6-9.) Grizzard was on probation for a 2009
felony “Criminal Domestic Violence” conviction when he committed the robbery in this case.
(PSI, pp.7, 9.) He also had a prior felony conviction for grand larceny. (PSI, p.7.) He had also
been convicted of several misdemeanor offenses, including simple assault, criminal domestic
violence, and second degree assault and battery.

(PSI, pp.6, 8.)

Additionally, Grizzard’s

criminal record contains multiple charges that were eventually dismissed, including simple
assault, simple assault and battery, malicious injury to property, criminal domestic violence,
assault and battery with intent to kill, and kidnapping. (PSI, pp.6-7.) Grizzard has had multiple
chances to be successful both on community supervision and while incarcerated, but he has
demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to conform his behavior to the law. (PSI, pp.6-9.)
As a result of having violated his probation in the 2009 domestic violence case, Grizzard
was incarcerated in a South Carolina prison for almost four years after he committed, but before
he was sentenced for, the robbery of which he was convicted in this case. (PSI, p.9.) Grizzard
reported that, while incarcerated, he earned his GED and participated in numerous programs,
including anger management, parenting, substance abuse classes, victim’s impact, Alcoholics
Anonymous, and Therapeutic Housing Community. (PSI, pp.7, 9.) The record shows, however,
that Grizzard also incurred a number of disciplinary sanctions while incarcerated, including for
“create/assist with social networking site,” possession of contraband, and three sanctions for
“possess or attempt to possess.” (PSI, p.9 (capitalization altered).) Grizzard incurred the last
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sanction less than one year before being released from prison and “turned over to Idaho officials”
in September 2017. (PSI, p.9.)
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Grizzard’s sentence, including Grizzard’s
violent criminal history, the risk he poses to the community, and the need for punishment in this
case. (6/18/18 Tr., p.21, L.20 – p.23, L.24.) The court expressly recognized that Grizzard had
been incarcerated in South Carolina for a number of years and that Grizzard had claimed to have
“changed” during that period of incarceration. (6/18/18 Tr., p.23, Ls.4-9.) The court, however,
was understandably “concern[ed]” by “the violence of [Grizzard’s] past criminal history” and
also “believe[d],” based on the crime in this case, that the sentence it imposed should have “a
deterrent effect,” as well as an aspect of “retribution and punishment.” (6/18/18 Tr., p.22, L.18 –
p.23, L.3.) That Grizzard would have liked the district court to have given more mitigating
weight to his most recent rehabilitative efforts does not establish an abuse of discretion.
Grizzard has failed to show that the sentence imposed (which, with credit for time served,
resulted in a fixed sentence of less than one year) is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts.
The state submits that Grizzard has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons
more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state
adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Grizzard’s conviction and sentence.

DATED this 4th day of February, 2019.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of February, 2019, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Essma.

Okay.

at this time you can address the

Mr. Grizzard,

You are not required to say anything,

Court if you'd like to.

but you're certainly welcome to.
THE DEFENDANT:
to the victim.

and

I

I

I'd like t0 take a moment and apologize

understand what

did that day was wrong,

I

And

accept responsibility for it.

there must be some punishment for that.

I

understand that

And

I

just hope one

day that they can forgive me for it.
The second,

10

to the Court,

for the last five years

11

I've worked on making a change with myself, not only for

12

myself but for my children, so that hopefully that I'd be able

13

to see them grow up and be a part of that and not have to

I4

watch them grow up from

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you,

sir.

Mr. Essma, any objection to the amount of

17
13

prison cell.

Thank you.

15
16

a

restitution being sought in this case?
ESSMA:

19

MR.

20

THE COURT:

No,

Your Honor.

All right.

The Court has reviewed the
I'll note for the

21

presentence investigation report.

22

record that

23

is filed *7 which i3 in the file regarding some irregularities

24

that occurred at his change of plea.

25

I

I

have reviewed

a

As well,

letter from the defendant which

have also Ieviewed the letters from his aunt,
21
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Ms.

Guerrero;

I've also

from Ms. Grizzard, his mother.

reviewed the documents showing that he Obtained his GED and
I've also

certain Work Keys class completions and so forth.

reviewed the victim impact statement that was submitted in

writing to the Court.

I‘ve considered the comments and

recommendations of both counsel.
I've considered

In arriving at my sentence today,

and applied the Toohill factors, namely,

the good order and

protection of society, which is the primary factor to take
as well as the deterrent effect of any sentence,

10

into account,

11

the likelihood of rehabilitation of the defendant, and the

12

need for retribution or punishment.

13

considered and applied the factors set forth in Idaho Code

14

Section 19-2521.

In addition,

I

have

With respect to the Toohill tasters, in this case

15
16

do believe that most 0f the factors are present: that i5,

17

there is a need to protect society in this case.
In locking through the PSI,

18

I

was.

quite frankly,

19

struck by the violence of the defendant‘s past criminal

20

history.

21

of a violent nature.

22

the sentencing of this particular matter,

23

consideration.

Every w—

think just about every crime in there was
That is of concern to the Court.
I

And in

do take that into

With respect to the deterrent effect 0f the

24

25

I

sentence,

I

l

do believe that, based upon the crime in this
22
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particular case, there is a deterrent effect that is required
as well

as some need for retribution and punishment in this

case.

With respect to the likelihood 0f rehabilitation 0f
I'm

the defendant,

been in custody for
Carolina, and

I

bit in

a
a

The defendant has

quandary.

a

little over four years in South

understand the argument that he has Changed.
How much of a Change has

The question for the Court is:

occurred as a result of that incarceration?
Nevertheless,

lO

do take that into consideration,

I

ll

but that is not the primary factor that «h which

12

in this particular case.

l3

history of the defendant, that there i5

14

rehabilitation through probatien, so

15

that's appropriate at all in this particular case.

I

am viewing

don't believe that, given the

Given those factors,

16

I

I

I

a

likelihood of

don't believe that

do believe that the

17

defendant is

18

involving some punitive aspect is entirely appropriate in this

19

case.

22

risk t0 the community and that a sentence

With that Said,

20
21

a

the Court pronounces sentence as

follows:
I

sentence the -- the defendant to a unified

sentence of 21 years, consisting of a 60-year fixed term and a
24

25

15—year indeterminate term.
I

And that is to serve.

do also order court -- or
23
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I

do impose court

